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Abstract: This paper examines the history of the 32nd Imperial Japanese Army headquarters tunnels, a 
major wartime heritage site, or, war site （sensō iseki）, from the 1945 Battle of Okinawa.  The paper shows 
that the tunnels, and their roles in history and memory, have been shaped by the successive and cumulative 
effects of past and ongoing discourses in a process that it calls “cultures of （dis） remembrance.”  In this 
context, the paper highlights three discourses that impacted the fate of the 32nd Army tunnels.  The first is a 
pre-1945 “assimilation discourse,” in which Japanese and Okinawan officials argued the historical and 
cultural similarities between the two regions to integrate the islands into Japan’s imperial nation-building 
project.  This transformed Shuri Castle, the seat of power for the autonomous Ryukyu Kingdom, into a 
staging ground for the dissemination of patriotic Japanese education, and it paved the way for the 32nd 
Army tunnels to be built there during the Battle of Okinawa.  The second is a post-1945 “Cold War 
discourse” in which U.S. army occupiers remodeled memories and markers of Ryukyuan cultural heritage 
and Japanese militarism to align with their postwar vision for Okinawa; namely, this was as a showcase for 
U.S.-style liberal democracy and as a springboard for the Cold War.  In this milieu, the remains of Shuri 
Castle were reconstructed as the University of the Ryukyus, while the 32nd Army tunnels were cast into the 
dustbin of history.  The harshness of American military rule, however, caused many Okinawans to push for 
reversion to Japan, and, in this background, wartime heritage sites were used to promote nationalistic 
narratives of shared Okinawan-Japanese sacrifice for the “homeland.”  After Okinawa returned to Japan in 
1972, dual visions of the island’s heritage emerged.  On the one hand, Okinawan progressives saw the 32nd 
Army tunnels as reminders of Okinawa’s subordinate position vis-à-vis the Japanese nation-state and the 
cause of the island’s wartime destruction.  On the other hand, some conservative politicians sought to erase 
memories of the tunnels in favor of an affirmative view of Okinawa’s cultural identity.
Keywords:  war sites （sensō iseki）, 32nd Army Headquarter tunnels, Shuri Castle, discourse, cultures of 
（dis） remembrance, assimilation, Cold War, nationalization, heritage, identity
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Introduction
From the late 1980s there has been a wealth of materials published on “war sites” （sensō iseki, or, senseki 
for short） from World War II in Japan.  This reflects a broader global interest in what Pierre Nora identified 
as “sites of memory” （liuex de mémorie） and what Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka called “cultural 
memory” objects.1）  The idea, as explained by Japanese war-site scholars Jūbishi Shunbu and Kikuchi 
Minoru is that, with fewer members of the wartime generation alive today, war memories are “moving from 
people to things （hito kara mono e）,” and that these places and objects can be used to “narrate” （kataru） 
war memories to future generations.2）  One war site to receive attention in this context has been the 32nd 
Army headquarter tunnel remains underneath Shuri Castle in Okinawa Prefecture.  During the Battle of 
Okinawa （April – June 1945）, the commanding 32nd Imperial Japanese Army constructed over 1  
kilometer of underground tunnels at this site, and from here they directed the deadliest fight of the Pacific 
in which 1 / 3  of the Okinawan population and over 200,000 Allied troops, Japanese soldiers, and civilians 
were killed.3）  Moreover, a barrage of shelling and bombing from U.S. ships and planes, so intense it was 
called a “typhoon of steel,” decimated the Okinawan landscape and turned the centuries-old Shuri Castle to 
rubble.  Yet despite this monumental history, war memories and heritages including the 32nd Army tunnels 
at Shuri were largely forgotten in the postwar and were, instead, replaced with alternative discourses and 
narratives on Okinawan identity and traditional Ryukyuan cultural heritage.
　The postwar history of the 32nd Army tunnels demonstrates that it is not war sites that “speak” （kataru） 
but rather people who speak for and about them.  In other words, they are situated squarely within the 
realm of discourse, and, moreover, as this essay shows, these discourses shape not only perception of such 
places and objects, but they also have tangible effects on the physical and mnemonic landscapes 
surrounding war sites.  This essay uses the case of the 32nd Army tunnels to show that war sites are engaged 
in processes that it calls “cultures of （dis） remembrance,” which it defines as the forgetting and 
remembering of objects in discourse.4）  As such, it is interested in untangling the various discourses that 
have impacted the tunnels either directly or indirectly vis-à-vis its, what Marie Louise Stig Sorensen and 
Dacia Viejo-Rose called, larger “biography of place.”5）  This means that, in addition to discourses related 
the tunnel’s roles in history and memory, the essay examines discourses on the larger biographical identity 
of the Shuri site and on Okinawan identity in general.  From this, the paper highlights three main discourses 
that affected the postwar fate of wartime and cultural heritage at Shuri.  These are: a prewar “assimilation 
discourse,” an early postwar “Cold War discourse,” and a 1972 reversion-era “nationalization discourse.” 
The essay then examines how these discourses and their effects have continued to compete for dominance 
into the present.  In this milieu, dual visions of Okinawa’s identity vis-à-vis Japan have emerged and have 
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coalesced around war sites like the 32nd Army tunnels resulting in conflicts of memory there.  By looking at 
the various cultures of （dis） remembrance produced by various cumulative and competing discourses, this 
essay sheds light on the complex relations between discourse, memory, and physical objects, and clarifies 
the transformation of memory at material sites over time.
1.“Assimilationdiscourse”andtheconstructionofthe32ndArmytunnels
The first discourse to influence the modern history of Shuri stretches from 1879 to the end of WWII, and it 
can be termed an “assimilation discourse,” because, during this time, the Japanese government sought to 
assimilate Okinawan residents as loyal imperial subjects.  Historically, Okinawa was home to the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, a semi-independent state with vassal relations to China and Japan, and which maintained trade 
relations with Korea and Southeast Asian nations.  Originally divided into three separate kingdoms – 
Hokuzan, Chuzan, and Nanzan – the island was unified in 1429 under Shō Hashi, who made Shuri Castle 
the seat of his government.  1477 to 1526 was a golden age for the Ryukyu Kingdom.  Under the reign of 
Shō Shin, Shuri Castle was expanded and renovated to its current Chinese architectural style, and many 
important cultural monuments were built in the area including Enkakuji temple in 1498 and an ornate stone 
bridge over Hōseichi pond in 1498.  Major literary works like the Omoro soshi were also written around 
this time, and people of the kingdom developed a consciousness of their culture and history.6）  However, in 
1609 the Tokugawa bakufu demanded allegiance from the Ryukyu Kingdom vis-à-vis the southern Satsuma 
domain, thus beginning a period of “dual-subordination” whereby Satsuma collected taxes from Ryukyu 
and monopolized their trade with China.7） 
　This situation continued until 1879 when the Meiji government forcefully abolished the Ryukyu 
Kingdom （i.e. the Ryukyu Disposition, or, Ryūkyū shobun） in response to Western incursions and 
ownership claims by Qing China.  In fact, before his July 1853 visit to Japan, U.S. Navy Commodore 
Matthew Perry and his expedition visited Ryukyu and pressured the kingdom to enter into a compact of 
“courtesy and friendship” that granted the U.S. military and trading rights.8）  From this point, the Meiji 
government adopted the language of assimilation （dōka） to argue that the Ryukyus had always been a part 
of Japan since ancient times, and that the two peoples had shared racial, linguistic, and cultural 
characteristics.9）  Despite this rhetoric, however, the government’s true interest lay in transforming Okinawa 
into a military bastion for the southern defense of mainland Japan.10）  Therefore, they gave little thought to 
the island’s economic development and improvement of people’s daily lives, and instead focused on 
cultivating patriotic and loyal subjects through “emperor-centered moral education （kōminka）” and military 
training.11）  Nevertheless, many Okinawan residents and intellectuals embraced the concepts of 
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Japanization and assimilation in hopes of modernizing the island, improving their economic standing, and 
securing political rights and representation under the 1889 Meiji Constitution.12） 
　At first, the Japanese government viewed Ryukyuan cultural heritage with suspicion and, after forcefully 
abolishing the centuries-old Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, they took the royal family as exiled hostages and 
sent military troops to occupy the 15th century Shuri Castle.  The Army’s Sixth （Kumamoto） Division 
thereafter used the castle’s main hall as their barracks until 1896.13）  In place of this, the government 
promoted assimilation policies through patriotic and militaristic education, and, toward this end, they 
constructed the Okinawa Normal School （Okinawa jinjō shihan gakko） and the Shuri Middle School on 
the former castle grounds in 1880.14）  At this time, Education Minister Mori Arinori introduced a military 
curriculum under on-duty military officers at Normal Schools around the country, reflecting the common 
perception was that military discipline was the most effective method to instill patriotic devotion to the 
state.15）  Moreover, in 1898, the military’s Okinawa Garrison （Okinawa chiku keibitai shireibu） established 
their headquarters in the Okinawa Normal school to recruit soldiers.16）  In this context, Shuri Castle as a 
marker of Ryukyuan heritage was neglected and fell into disrepair during the decades of the Sino- and 
Russo-Japanese Wars （1894-5 and 1904-5 respectively）.  During this time, for instance, wartime austerity 
forced the Okinawa Normal School to temporarily use the castle’s main hall as a dormitory, and student 
Toyokawa Yoshiki, recounted that the feudal structure had “fallen into ruin and had none of its former 
glory.”17）  Inside, students slept on tatami mats that they spread around the floor and pillars and used white 
pieces of curtain cloth as room dividers.  Toyokawa described the situation as “extremely unsightly,” and 
wrote that “the dormitory rooms were incredibly unsanitary, and, because of the wartime austerity budget 
we didn’t have enough to eat.  In this situation, many students became sick from malnutrition and extreme 
fatigue.”18） 
　However, even Ryukyuan cultural heritage like 
Shuri Castle eventually became objects of 
assimilationist discourse and were utilized in service 
of the Imperial Japanese nation state.  In 1924, 
architect Itō Chūta, for example, convinced the 
Japanese Home Ministry to preserve Shuri Castle’s 
main hall and transform it into Okinawa Shrine.20） 
The shrine honored, among others, the last 
Ryukyuan King, Shō  Tai,  for his role of 
incorporating Ryukyu into the Japanese state.21）  In 
【IMG.1】　A prewar image of students from
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this way, Itō disarmed Shuri Castle as a marker of Ryukyuan independence and, instead, and integrated it 
into the emperor-centered Japanese imperial project.22）  Moreover, some mainland academics held a 
pluralist view of the Japanese empire, in which Ryukyuan culture was, in fact, simply a regional variation 
of “Japanese culture,” and, therefore, could be utilized to strengthen the foundations of the imperial state 
and kokutai.  In 1943, and against the background of the Asia-Pacific War （1931 – 1945）, for instance, a 
group of scholars writing in the Japanese magazine Fūkei （Landscape） stated that the “image of ancient 
Japan ［...］ still remains intact” in Okinawa, and that it was epitomized through Okinawan architecture, the 
“fundamental essence” of which “is originally Japanese.”  Any cultural differences were explained away by 
these scholars to only be “slight regional differences from the mainland,” and they concluded that 
“Okinawan architecture is fundamentally the same as architecture on the Japanese mainland.”23） 
　Okinawans also adopted an assimilationist view of Ryukyuan cultural heritage with an eye toward lifting 
the island out of poverty.  Naha Mayor and head of the Okinawa Tourist Association （Okinawa kankō 
kyōkai）, Kinjō Kikō, for instance, wrote in 1937 that increasing “the collective knowledge of Okinawa” by 
utilizing its “tourist potential” was “vital for the benefit of the Japanese state （hōka）.”24）  Likewise, in 1940 
local politician Wakagumi Rōjin advocated preserving Shuri Castle by transforming it into a high school. 
In this way, he argued that “Shuri Castle could once again become the center of politics and culture in 
Okinawa for hundreds, perhaps even thousands of years.”25）  Wakagumi framed his ideas in the context of 
Japanese empire building, and stated, for example, that as a school of higher education, Shuri could train 
Okinawans to go abroad and develop Japan’s southern colonies throughout Greater East Asia （daitōa）.26） 
　However, assimilation discourses had deadly consequences in the 1945 Battle of Okinawa since they 
reinforced the imagined hierarchical dichotomy between the “superior” Japanese colonizer and “inferior” 
Okinawan Other.  Moreover, it created an atmosphere in which the patriotism and devotion of Okinawans 
to the Japanese imperial project was constantly in question, and the Japanese military in particular viewed 
island residents as “primitive natives” who lacked “loyalty” to the Japanese empire.  Thus, they enacted 
harsh punishments on anyone caught speaking the Okinawan language, or those who inadvertently 
wandered too close to secure military facilities.  Nevertheless, such rigid measures often had the effect of 
making many want to prove their loyalty as “Japanese” citizens even more, and, as Okinawan scholar Ōta 
Masahide wrote, such discrimination caused average Okinawans to “ben［d］ over backwards to become 
more Japanese than the Japanese in mainland Japan.” “And to be Japanese,” Ōta continued, “meant to die 
for the Emperor like Japanese.”27）  In this context, when the Japanese 32nd Army moved into their defense 
position on Okinawa in preparation for Allied attack, they commandeered school buildings including the 
Okinawa Normal School and put students to work for the war effort.  From December 1944, Normal 
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School students were mobilized to construct headquarter tunnels for the 32nd Army underneath Shuri Castle. 
One Normal School Student who worked on the tunnels, Chinen Kiyoshi, said: “I thought that the stage 
was set for me to give my life for my country ［...］ I think all of us felt that way.  ［...］ The militarist 
education had affected every sinew of my body.”28）  When they were completed, General Chō Osamu 
christened the tunnel complex “Heaven’s Grotto” （Ama no iwato） in reference to the mythical cave where 
the goddess Amaterasu hid herself and concealed the world in darkness.  This was the ultimate symbolic 
assimilation of Ryukyuan cultural heritage as Shuri – once the pinnacle of Ryukyuan independence – was 
sublimated into esoteric Japanese mythology.
2.“ColdWardiscourse”andtheAmerican“modernization”ofShuri
During their advance from April 1945, American forces pounded Shuri with a barrage of bombs and 
shelling that devastated the castle and turned the area into what one New York Times reporter described as a 
“crater-of-the-moon landscape.”29）  They also carried with them attitudes and discourses that shaped the 
future of the former castle-turned-military base.  This led to the second discourse and culture of （dis） 
remembrance there – a “Cold War discourse” that replaced memories of the site’s feudal and military 
history with narratives of its new role as a symbol of the victory of U.S.-style modernity and liberal-
democracy.  The Americans perceived their version of modernity （i.e. liberal-democratic government and 
capitalist economy） as not only superior, but also as the “correct model” for other developing nations to 
follow.  This view, called Modernization Theory, blamed Japanese militarism on the country’s inability to 
properly modernize and overcome feudalism.30）  The aims of the U.S. in Japan, therefore, were to eliminate 
remnants of feudalism and militarism and to replace them with U.S.-style liberalism and institutions.31） 
This would, it was hoped, not only guide Japan out of the feudal past, but also into the arms of “modernity” 
（i.e. “the U.S.”） and away from its “deviant” form of Communism.  The same was true for the U.S. 
military’s aims in Okinawa, which was cut off from mainland Japan and placed under U.S. military rule 
from 1945 until 1972, and it manifest itself at the Shuri site in various ways.  Namely, the site’s history as a 
feudal castle and former military headquarters were forgotten and were replaced with a new identity as a 
symbol of the supremacy of the American way of life.  This was illustrated by the University of the 
Ryukyus （hereafter UofR）, which the U.S. built atop the rubble of Shuri Castle in 1949-50.
　American Cold War discourse portrayed Okinawans as willingly casting off the fetters of their feudal 
past and accepting modernization of their own accord.  Thus, a 1949 report from the Ryukyus Command 
（RYCOM） depicted local Okinawans as happily hauling away rubble as U.S. bulldozers leveled the castle 
site to create the foundations of the UofR.32）  The idea of the backwards and traditional past being replaced 
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by the superior, modern future was also evidenced in the location of the university’s administrative center, 
which was set atop the foundations of the former Shuri Castle’s main hall, as well as its architectural design 
– a mix of Ryukyuan and American influences.  In this regard, it served to mask the hard realities of 
American power.  Accordingly, the first student handbook of the university （gakusei binran） issued in 
1950 stated that “the university is neither Japanese nor American,” but was rather the harbinger of a new 
culture, blended from “the old and the new” and which would carry “a new light into every village in the 
Ryukyu islands.”33）  At the same time, a January 1951 ordinance officially establishing the university stated 
that education would be provided only insofar as “is consistent with the military occupation,” and it stressed 
that “no avowed or proved Communist” was allowed to work there.34） 
　The process of erasure/replacement at Shuri was evidenced, for instance, in a January 1951 invitation to 
the university’s opening ceremony written by United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands 
（USCAR） Brigadier General John Hinds.  “This institution grew out of the rubble of war,” began Hinds, 
and he continued:
The bulldozers were able to clear the debris from the location, but they could not scrape away three 
generations of moral and intellectual subjugation.  ［...］ The day chosen for the ceremonies seems to 
me to be highly proper.  Lincoln’s birthday will be celebrated on these Islands for the sixth time since 
the close of World War II.  In the Ryukyus, Lincoln’s name is remembered with great affection as a 
symbol of devotion to the betterment of men and women who have known subjugation.  The 
Ryukyuans have raised a monument to this ideal in the very building of the University by their own 
hands, standing as it does on a war-devastated eminence once dominated by a 14th century feudal 
castle.”35） 
Thus, Hinds described the construction of the UofR as a symbolic victory of U.S.-led modernity over the 
ancient forces of feudalism and militarism, a condition that he compared to liberation from bondage.  In 
this capacity, the U.S. was playing a role similar to Abraham Lincoln freeing the slaves, said Hinds, 
although he was also careful to give a nod to Okinawans themselves, indicating that they were willingly 
ridding themselves of their chains by building the University of the Ryukyus “by their own hands.”  In this 
way, his statement served to mask the realities of American military hegemony on the island.
　Similarly, General Douglas MacArthur wrote in a prepared speech for the ceremony that:
Establishment of the University of the Ryukyus is an event of outstanding importance in the cultural 
and intellectual history of these Islands.  It is, moreover, particularly appropriate that the University, 
founded upon the ancient site of the throne of Ryukyuan kings, should be dedicated on the birthday of 
one who though personally humble was himself kingly among the great of the world -- Abraham 
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Lincoln.  ［...］ Conceived in the aftermath of war and intended to flourish in the ways of peace, the 
University is born as the champions of freedom rally once more to defend their heritage against those 
forces that would enslave the mind of man.  This concern for freedom of learning, for things of the 
spirit, which brought this University into being has never been dimmed by the obscurantism and the 
oppression designed to extinguish it.36） 
Building on the themes expressed by Hinds of the victory of U.S.-style liberal-democracy over feudalism 
and militarism, MacArthur further linked this to its eventual victory in the ongoing Cold War against 
communism.  This view envisioned this as a fight between “freedom” and “peace” on the one hand, and 
slavery, “obscurantism” and “oppression” on the other.  The establishment of the UofR, thus, became a 
symbolic expression tying Okinawans to their new role in defending this shared heritage in the fight for 
men’s minds.
　The views of U.S. leaders toward the Shuri site were clearly expressed throughout the early history of 
the UofR.  For instance, at a January 1955 dedication speech for the university’s newly-constructed Shikiya 
Memorial Library, USCAR Governor General Lyman Lemnitzer stated:
Less than one hundred years ago, it was upon this site that the leaders and rulers of Okinawa were 
born and educated for responsibilities of leadership.  These were however, children born of a 
privileged class and in number few.  History repeats itself, for it is here, upon the same location, that 
new leaders are being prepared and educated for later responsibilities.  Today’s opportunities for 
development, however, differ in that they exist to be offered upon a democratic basis - not to those, 
alone, who are born of a privileged class and 
with financial wealth, but to those who, of 
themselves, possess the greatest wealth of all - 
the capacity for learning, the capacity for 
intellectual development, and the desire for 
constructive utilization of knowledge for the 
benefit of the society of which they are 
members.  Dedicated to the concept of service, 
the University, with its subordinate institutions, 
embraces the philosophy of helping people to 
help themselves.  ［...］ There are those who 
would cling to comforts in remnants of the old; 
there are those who would have this institution 
【IMG.2】　Around 2000 people gathered on
the grounds of theUniversity of the
Ryukyus on April 1, 1952 for the
inaugurat ion ceremony of the
Government of the Ryukyu Islands.
In the background is the university
administrative building, which sat
atop the former main hall of Shuri
Castle.37） 
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removed in order that a castle might be rebuilt as an emblem and a symbol of a philosophy of 
government and of living, that, may we pray to God, is forever dead.  In its place, there stands a new 
national monument - a new national shrine - dedicated not to the dead of history, but dedicated to the 
living present and to the future living.38） 
Lemnitzer demonstrated a keen understanding of Shuri’s history.  Referencing its role as a place of 
education and governance, he indicated that this had been replaced by new, presumably superior and more 
modern, forms of these represented by the UofR.  He then adamantly spoke against reconstructing any 
forms of the castle, saying instead that he hoped that the feudalism for which it stood was “forever dead.” 
Moreover, Lemnitzer’s depiction of the university as a “new national shrine” is hardly insignificant 
considering the site’s brief prewar history as Okinawa Shrine.  In this way, he critiqued the site’s former 
incarnations, its history as a military base included, as the “dead of history” and instead indicated that its 
function as the UofR was where its true present and future lay.
　Such statements illustrate how U.S. military leaders like Hinds, MacArthur, and Lemnitzer perceived the 
symbolic role of the university: as a representation of the victory of American-style liberal-democracy over 
feudalism, militarism, and, eventually （they hoped） communism.  Moreover, the symbolic construction of 
the university in this Cold War discourse camouflaged the realities of American military dominance and 
power on Okinawa.  This discourse continued throughout the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and was 
reinforced vis-à-vis U.S. Army programs like the Michigan Mission which sent educators from Michigan 
State College to the UofR from 1951 to 1968 to instruct Okinawan students in American values and to, in 
the words of one program organizer, to “give them a better understanding of democracy.”39）  Moreover, in 
this climate, challenges to this discourse were harshly suppressed, and students who threatened to expose 
the realities of U.S. military domination were expelled from the university.40）  In this way, the U.S. military 
occupation of Okinawa and U.S. Cold War discourse there acted as a culture of （dis） remembrance at 
Shuri that replaced memories and narratives of one past with that of another.  The material effects of this 
discourse were felt through the physical erasure of Shuri Castle and the 32nd Army tunnels and the 
construction of the UofR in their place.
3.Japanese“nationalizationandreversiondiscourse”andShuriCastle（redux）
At first, popular attitudes in Okinawa largely aligned with U.S. Cold War discourse, and people generally 
accepted the idea that the Americans had rescued Okinawa from the slave-like yoke of Japanese militarism. 
However, by the mid-1950s the harshness of U.S. military rule, the seizure of Okinawan land by the U.S. 
military to build bases, and a desire by many in Okinawa to benefit from the economic boom underway on 
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the mainland prompted attitudes to shift back in 
favor of reversion to Japan.  In this context, a 
“nationalization discourse” emerged vis-à-vis 
Ryukyuan heritage and wartime memories in 
Okinawa.  Even students at the UofR, the U.S.’s pet 
project of pro-American style liberal-democracy on 
the island, became outspoken critics of U.S. military 
rule, and articles in one school newspaper, the 
Ryūdai Taimuzu, for example, carried headlines 
such as “We Want to Raise the Japanese Flag.”
The question in Okinawa, thus, became how to promote discourses of Japanese nationalization and 
reversion and how to utilize cultural and wartime heritage toward this end.  This was complicated by the 
fact that USCAR and the semi-autonomous Government of the Ryukyu Islands （GRI） selectively 
manipulated elements of Okinawan cultural heritage to argue the idea of a unique Okinawan culture （as 
distinct from Japanese culture） in an attempt to drive a wedge between Okinawa and Japan and, thereby, 
making it easier for the U.S. to control.41）  In this context, members of the UofR initially opposed restoring 
and preserving Shuri Castle as a marker of Ryukyuan cultural heritage, not only because it would threaten 
the existence of the university itself, but also because it would, in the 1959 words of one Student Council 
member, play into the hands of the Americans and their efforts to “separate Okinawa from the homeland 
（sokoku） ［i.e. Japan］.”  The author further argued that Shuri castle was a “symbol of feudalism” which 
represented the “culture of the rulers （shihaisha no bunka）,” and, therefore, “considering that Okinawa has 
not yet fully democratized ［...］ is not a cultural symbol ［...］ that we should be proud of.”42） 
　Against this background, some Okinawans instead turned to the nationalization of war memories to 
promote their cause for reversion.  This was done mainly through the construction of nationalistic historical 
narratives at former battle sites and monuments that emphasized the shared nature of Okinawan-Japanese 
sacrifice for the sake of protecting the nation and the kokutai.  Although Japanese conservatives adopted a 
lukewarm attitude toward Okinawan reversion in general, they supported pro-Japanese nationalist 
narratives of the Battle of Okinawa and saw this as a relatively painless and cost-free opportunity to 
exercise Japanese sovereignty over the island by building historical markers at former battle sites.  For 
example, between 1963 and 1966, thirty prefectural memorials to commemorate Japanese war dead were 
built at Mabuni.43）  Meanwhile, some Okinawan businesses saw this as an opportunity to partially alleviate 
the poor state of the Okinawan economy that had suffered under exploitative U.S. military direction.  This 
【IMG.3】　This 1961 Ryūdai Taimuzu article
tit led “We Want to Raise the
JapaneseFlag” shows the extent of
resentment toward U.S. military rule
and the desire to revert to the
Japanesemainland.
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led to a war-site tourism boom via bus tours of southern war sites （nanbu senseki） that catered to mainland 
Japanese tourists, and especially former Japanese soldiers and bereaved family members.
　In 1968, for example, the Okinawa Tourism Association （Okinawa kankō kaihatsu jigyōdan） surveyed 
the 32nd Army tunnels to gauge their tourist potential among mainland Japanese visitors.  For the OTA, 
tourism was an “intangible export” and war sites for Japanese tourists were the top draw.  In their survey 
report, the OTA envisioned the Shuri area transformed into a park and recreation area, surrounded by 
businesses and hotels, that centered around the restored and accessible 32nd Army tunnels as the main 
attraction.  The report explained:
These days, the biggest tourist draw is battle sites from World War II and war sites at those places. 
This includes the monuments and memorials that each prefecture has built to memorialize the brave 
souls, who gave their precious lives for the glory of the state and died fighting in a far-off land on the 
southern front. Some may certainly hesitate a little at the idea of turning war sites into tourist 
attractions （shigen）; however, if we stop to consider that these places are being developed as places 
where the hatred of war can be turned into prayers for peace, their significance should be evident. To 
develop the tourist potential of war sites, it is necessary to provide the proper facilities for them as 
sacred spaces （reichi） and to transform the various war memorials, headquarter tunnels, and hospital 
tunnels into properly serviced and landscaped park areas.44） 
In this way, the OTA perceived war sites as tourist materials to cater to mainland visitors.  Moreover, in the 
pro-reversion and Japanese-nationalist climate of the time, the group espoused an historical narrative that 
would appeal to Japanese visitors’ sensibilities.  Namely, this was the idea that war sites were sacred 
memorial spaces where visitors could honor the memory of Japanese soldiers who gave their “precious 
lives for the glory of the state.”
　In addition, in 1970 the OTA restored and opened the Former Japanese Navy Underground Headquarters 
on the Oroku Penninsula near Naha, and at this site, too, they similarly emphasized a narrative that 
portrayed Okinawan war deaths as glorious sacrifices for the Japanese nation-state.  A centerpiece of the 
tunnel’s historical description, for instance, was a telegram sent to Imperial Headquarters by Japanese Navy 
commander Ōta Minoru just before the Battle of Okinawa ended in June 1945.  The telegram read:
In desperation, some parents have asked the military to protect their daughters, for fear that when the 
enemy comes, elders and children will be killed and young women and girls will be taken to private 
areas and harmed （dokuga）.45）  After military medical personnel had moved on, the volunteer nurses 
stayed behind to help the badly wounded move.  They are dedicated and go about their work with a 
strong will.  ［...］ The Okinawan people have been asked to volunteer their labor and conserve all their 
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resources （mostly without complaint）.  In their heart, they wish only to serve as loyal Japanese.  ［...］ 
This is how the Okinawan people have fought the war.  And for this reason, I appeal to you to give the 
Okinawan people special consideration from this day forward.46） 
Despite its nationalistic overtones, Ōta’s message likely struck a chord with many in Okinawa in the late 
1960s and early 1970s who strongly wished in their hearts to be Japanese.  Moreover, it would have 
appealed to the high number of Japanese tourists visiting Okinawan battle sites like this one at the time. 
Incidentally, Ōta’s telegram continues to form a key part of the Japanese Navy tunnels site which is 
operated by the OTA’s successor, the Okinawa Convention and Visitors Bureau.
　Meanwhile, once Okinawa’s reversion to Japan had become a concrete reality by the late 1960s and early 
1970s, heritage discourses were adapted to suit the changed political and diplomatic climate.47）  Namely, 
Ryukyuan cultural heritage lost its potency as an American propaganda tool and instead was readied for its 
transformation and sublimation into the Japanese system of cultural properties （bunkazai）.  In short, these 
objects represented valuable cultural capital for the Japanese government that promised not only high 
returns from the tourist industry, but also, as in the prewar, to strengthen and deepen the foundations of 
“Japanese” culture by portraying it as more diverse and multifaceted than may have been previously 
imagined.  In other words, it was the nationalization of heritage.  An outline of the specific plan for the 
reversion of Okinawa passed by the Japanese Diet in 1970, for instance, noted the preservation and 
restoration of Okinawan cultural properties as an important pillar of reversion.  Moreover, it made clear 
that these were to be made into “Japanese ［national］ cultural properties” （kuni no bunkazai）.48）  Similarly, 
Adachi Kenji, head of the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs, stated in 1971 that “Okinawan cultural 
properties hold a unique place in our national heritage” and “are a part of ancient Japanese cultural 
traditions.”49）  The GRI also petitioned the GOJ to restore Shuri Castle, emphasizing its “high value as a 
source for tourism” and stating that “this kind of unparalleled cultural heritage is fundamental for a correct 
understanding of our national citizen’s （kokumin） history and culture.50）  In this context, with the mission 
of reversion secured, the UofR began plans to close down its Shuri Campus and move its buildings to the 
new Senbaru Campus about 7.5 km away to make way for the reconstruction of Shuri Castle, this time as a 
marker of Japanese-Okinawan integration.
4.Dualvisionsof“Okinawanheritage”
At the same time, the reality of reversion to Japan meant that Okinawan progressives and leftists no longer 
had to adopt discourses of pro-Japanese nationalism that had previously surrounded wartime and cultural 
heritage.  Instead, they sought to redefine Okinawan’s positionality and identity vis-à-vis the Japanese 
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mainland via a critical reassessment of the historical narrative.  Especially given the subordinate position of 
Okinawa in the framework of the Japanese nation-state post-reversion （e.g. excessive burden of military 
bases, poorest economy, high unemployment etc.）, wartime and cultural heritage were revaluated with a 
critical eye toward historical instances of subjugation and discrimination by Japan.  This led to dual visions 
of “Okinawan heritage.”  On the one hand, the GOJ emphasized its nationalized version of traditional 
Ryukyuan heritage like Shuri castle （redux） that served as a symbolic reminder of Okinawa’s successful 
incorporation into the Japanese nation-state.  On the other hand, Okinawan progressives used cultural and 
especially wartime heritage to emphasize historical and ongoing instances of Okinawa’s subordinate 
position relative Japan.
　This became apparent from around the time of reversion.  In 1972, for instance, Ōta Masahide, one of 
the mobilized students that dug the 32nd Army tunnels and who witnessed the wartime destruction of Shuri 
Castle, blamed the destruction of Okinawan cultural heritage partly on prewar nationalist assimilation 
policies and Japanese militarism.
We ［...］ were so busy with military training and digging tunnels that we didn’t even have time to use 
these pieces of cultural heritage ［Shuri Castle］ to consider the unfinished work of our ancestors. 
Moreover, since we hadn’t adequately acquired the knowledge to grasp the meaning of this cultural 
heritage, we couldn’t correctly pass it on to later generations. One reason for this was that the Central 
and Prefectural governments only utilized unique （koyū） Okinawa culture when it was useful to 
achieve their military aims. In all other cases, as the policies to eradicate the “Okinawan dialect” 
indicated, the government judged that persistently emphasizing Okinawan cultural difference would 
negatively affect their efforts to incorporate Okinawans as national Japanese citizens. Therefore, they 
denounced such culture, and this was the main reason why susceptible youth such as ourselves were 
not made fully aware of our cultural heritage.51） 
This was a much different view of Ryukyuan cultural heritage than had been previously emphasized in the 
postwar.  On the one hand, Ōta eschewed using such heritage to support either side in the dichotomy of 
“independent Ryukyu” vs.  “common ancestry,” and instead he accepted that Okinawa was, for better or for 
worse, a part of the Japanese nation-state.  On the other hand, he was high critical of Okinawa’s 
positionality in this framework, and he blamed the wartime loss of traditional cultural objects on the 
mistreatment by the Japanese central government.
　Okinawan writer and critic Ōshiro Tatsuhiro adopted a similarly critical reassessment of wartime 
heritage sites and the historical narratives that had been previously emphasized there.  In 1977, he wrote 
that these places catered to mainland Japanese visitors by glorifying the noble sacrifices of Japanese 
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soldiers and Okinawan civilians for the nation-state, rather than emphasizing the view of many Okinawans 
that their deaths in battle had been for nothing （inuuji）.  In this way, he stated, they were “just like a 
memorial that would have been built in Tokyo or somewhere else on the mainland” and made “no attempt 
to narrate Okinawan experiences and the Okinawan subjectivity.”52） 
　The idea of using wartime heritage sites, i.e. war sites （sensō iseki）, to emphasize narratives of civilian 
suffering rather than wartime heroism and to stoke anti-war sentiment – the main contemporary view in 
Japan – in many ways, began in this context in Okinawa. In particular, they were part of an attempt to 
illustrate the suffering and subjugation of Okinawa at the hand of the Japanese government and military. 
As a 1977 statement by the Association to Reflect on the Battle of Okinawa （Okinawa-sen o kangaeru kai） 
read, for instance: 
War sites where Okinawan civilians wandered the battlefield and were either killed in battle or 
narrowly survived, sites that express a particular characteristic of the Battle of Okinawa, or sites such 
as buildings or structures that bear the destructive scars of battle are extremely important historical 
materials for Okinawa.  Such war sites are tangible materials that can relate （kataru） the details of 
civilian wartime experiences which form the backbone of postwar Okinawan thought and behavior. 
［...］ Moreover, these war sites and war remains show the results of the Asia-Pacific War – the 
culmination of events in modern Japanese history – and they are unique historical markers that can be 
found nowhere else in Japan but in Okinawa.  At the same time, as common historical heritage with 
Japan they have great value as historical resources for all of Japan.53） 
In other words, this statement conveys the idea of war sites and heritage as tangible markers of Okinawan 
suffering and physical proof of a history of unequal relations between Japan-Okinawa that eventually 
resulted in the sacrifice and destruction of the island.
　Two events in the early 1980s further strengthened this understanding of wartime heritage.  The first 
came when the Japanese Ministry of Education （MOE） removed a passage about Japanese troops 
murdering Okinawan civilians during the Battle of Okinawa from high-school history textbooks in 1982. 
This caused an uproar in Okinawa and led to greater efforts to uncover civilian experiences at war sites 
there.54）  The second was the 1982 release of the Japanese government’s （hereafter GOJ） Second Plan to 
Promote the Development of Okinawa （Dai niji Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu keikaku） which planned to 
greatly increase tourism to Okinawa.55）  Following this, in the mid-1980s the GOJ also permitted Japanese 
schools to use airplanes for travel on school trips, meaning that Okinawa became a popular choice for 
children’s educational field trips.56）  Thus in 1985, over 280 schools and nearly 49,500 students visited the 
island.57）  Although the GOJ was focused on promoting Okinawa as a tropical paradise and sea resort with 
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unique cultural heritage, Okinawan progressives seized this tourism boom as an opportunity to also educate 
visitors about Okinawa’s subordinate position in the Japanese nation-state.
　One key method to do this was through the use of wartime heritage sites, and Okinawan progressives 
and peace groups released informational guides to these places, as well as pushed for their preservation.  In 
his 1985 book Okinawan War Sites and Military Bases （Okinawa no senseki to gunji kichi）, for example, 
author Aniya Masaaki criticized the GOJ’s attempts to censor the Battle of Okinawa and to portray it 
simply with “beautified stories of sacrifice for the nation （junkoku bidan）.”  He also lamented the prior and 
current use of wartime heritage sites like those at Mabuni which were uncritical of the war and were like 
“Okinawan version［s］ of Yasukuni.”58）  Nevertheless, Aniya maintained that war sites had tremendous 
potential to counter beautified official GOJ narratives of the war by serving as critical spaces to reflect on 
the past and to pass on civilian wartime experiences and memories.
Traveling around to war sites and investigating what the war was actually like there is one of the best 
ways to promote peace education.  As of yet, we haven’t been able to fully survey these places and 
make use of them as teaching materials.  More than anything, what we need to do now is to quickly 
survey and record the conditions of war sites, and to urgently work for their preservation.  As the 
touristification of Okinawa proceeds, many valuable war sites are being destroyed, or are being used 
instead to beautify the war.  In addition to maintaining critical perspectives toward war, we must also 
offer detailed plans for the preservation of war sites and think of means to pass them on to later 
generations.59） 
　Aniya’s call to preserve war sites was taken up by other Okinawan progressives.  Since 1983, for 
instance, high-school teacher Yoshihama Shinobu had been working with his classes to record civilian 
wartime experiences in their community of Haebaru.  Eventually, this drew their attention to the remains of 
the Japanese Army field hospital tunnels that were also located there.  This was the site where many 
members of the Himeyuri Corps had worked to treat injured soldiers and had lost their lives.  In 1987, 
Yoshihama began to work to have the army field hospital tunnel remains designated as a Cultural Property 
（bunkazai）.60）  This was the first instance that such a designation had been sought for any war site in Japan, 
and it had the potential to transform interpretations not only the concept of “cultural heritage” but also of 
Okinawa’s relationship to the mainland.  However, the GOJ opposed Okinawan efforts to utilize wartime 
heritage in this way.  The Agency for Cultural Affairs （ACA）, for example, countered Yoshihama’s aim to 
preserve the army field hospital remains by claiming that “not enough time has passed for their historical 
value to be established.”61）  This was an extension of their unofficial policy that at least one hundred years 
must have passed for an object to be recognized as a “cultural property” （bunkazai）.62） 
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　These two opposing views of Okinawan heritage 
came into conflict at the Shuri Castle site.  The GOJ 
pushed for the further nationalization of the site and 
strove to make ancient Ryukyan cultural heritage 
the center of dominant memories there.  Takara 
Tetsuo, head of the Okinawa Council for the 
Preservation of Cultural Properties, for example, 
wrote to the Okinawa Board of Education in 1980 
that “existing buildings and objects, or the 
construction of new structures, within the grounds 
of the Shuri Castle site that do not fit in with its operation as a Nationally Designated Historical Site should 
be removed.”63）  Moreover, in 1986 the central government further nationalized the Shuri site by designating 
it as part of its Okinawa Commemorative National Government Park （kokuei Okinawa kinen kōen） and 
pushed forward plans to reconstruct the castle under the catchphrase “Okinawa’s postwar won’t be over 
until Shuri Castle is restored.”64）  This drew the ire of some local residents, however, when newly 
reconstructed castle park forced fifty households off the property to make way for a parking lot capable of 
accommodating large tour buses.  In one angry report, residents critiqued the plan as “undemocratic” and 
“profit-motivated,” and claimed that it “sacrificed residents for the sake of tourism.”65）  In addition, the 
group drew parallels between Okinawa’s wartime treatment and the current castle restoration writing that 
“during the war, the same place that was turned into a battlefield and experienced the ravages of war for the 
sake of the Japanese Empire’s policy of preserving the kokutai, is once again being rushed through an 
administrative-led project for the success of the kokutai.”66） 
　With no little irony, the GOJ completed the restoration of Shuri Castle in 1992 to commemorate the 
twentieth anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  Yet many in Okinawa criticized the fact that this 
restoration project now seemed to be serving to erase memories of the Battle of Okinawa at the site 
including the 32nd Army tunnels.  In 1992, for instance, the Ryūkyū Shinpo serialized a forty-six-part series 
titled “The Battle of Okinawa Lies Below Shuri Castle” （Shurijō chika no Okinawa-sen）.  The series began 
by ironically contrasting the scene of Shureimon bustling with tourists with the nearby entrance to the 32nd 
Army tunnels that were covered in brush and which “hardly anyone knows.”67）  This was a shame, it stated, 
because the tunnels were, in fact, the “hypocenter of the tragedy of the Battle of Okinawa,” a fact that it 
pounded home throughout the rest of the series by focusing on civilian wartime memories and tying them 
to the 32nd command post at Shuri.  In addition to highlighting first-hand testimonies of the murder by the 
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Japanese army of Okinawan civilians as “spies” at the Shuri site, 
it also included calls from wartime survivors and others for the 
preservation of the 32nd Army tunnels.  Nakamura Fumiko, for 
example, said that “the 32nd Army Headquarter Tunnels were the 
main source of Okinawa’s suffering.  Isn’t there something wrong 
about reconstructing Shuri Castle but not restoring the tunnels?” 
Similarly, Tokuyama Osamu stated: “the 32nd Army Headquarter 
Tunnels symbolize the horrors of the Battle of Okinawa.  We 
need to move beyond seeing the Shuri Castle site as a bright 
marker of Ryūkyū culture, and to understand the human 
suffering that is hidden by this.”  And finally, Higa Fusao, one of 
the Okinawa Normal School students who had dug the tunnels, 
explained that “once you’ve lost the ability to criticize, you’ve 
lost everything.  All the war history should be brought to light 
and made clear.  The tunnels should be opened to the public.”68） 
5.TheerasureofwarmemoryatShuri
Indeed, the time to recognize war memories at Shuri by preserving the 32nd Army tunnels seemed to be ripe 
under the tenure of Okinawa Governor Ōta Masahide in the 1990s.  Ōta planned three pillars to form what 
he termed his “peace administration” （heiwa gyōsei）, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end 
of the war, and to transform Okinawa’s image into a “transmitter of peace” （heiwa no hasshinchi 
Okinawa）.69）  As previously mentioned, Ōta was one of the original Blood and Iron Student Corps members 
who had built and worked in the tunnels.  In addition, as a scholar and prolific writer, Ōta was perhaps the 
most knowledgeable person alive regarding the tunnels and their history.  During his tenure as governor of 
Okinawa, in regard to war memories, he led one of the most progressive administrations in postwar 
Okinawan history.  The 1990s was also a special time for war memory in Japan.  In particular, some 
Japanese politicians publicly took a more conciliatory stance regarding Japan’s wartime responsibility.  In 
1993, Kōno Yōhei, for example, partly acknowledged the Japanese government’s role operating the 
“comfort women” system of forcing women to work as sex slaves for the Japanese Army.70）  And in 1995 
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi apologized for Japan having fought a war of aggression against its 
Asian neighbors.71）  Regarding war sites, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial （Genbaku Dome） was preserved 
as a Nationally Designated Historic Site （shiseki） that same year.
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　In the early 1990s, Ōta thus made efforts to survey and preserve the 32nd Army tunnels, and he appeared 
to have support across the political spectrum in the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly.  Ōta and his 
administration secured funds to survey the tunnels and commissioned a special committee of academics 
and public officials to assess the feasibility of preserving and opening them to the public.  In 1996, the 
committee released their first report which described that the tunnels were invaluable “chroniclers” 
（kataribe） that were “indispensable for relating the tragedy of the Battle of Okinawa” to future 
generations.72）  Moreover, the report noted that, prior to this, the GOJ had focused solely on constructing 
the site’s identity around the reconstructed Shuri Castle while neglecting markers of the site’s wartime 
history like the 32nd Army tunnels.  The committee rejected this approach, however, and advocated a 
pluralistic approach to the Shuri site’s biographical identity, writing that:
Through the cultural heritage of Shuri Castle and the historical heritage of the 32nd Army headquarter 
tunnels, the site relates both the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom and the conditions of the Battle of 
Okinawa.  While the heritage from the Ryukyu Kingdom is splendid and “bright,” the parts from the 
Battle of Okinawa are tragic and “dark.”  Nevertheless, both of these constitute the history of 
Okinawa.73） 
In addition, the report critically assessed Okinawa’s relationship to mainland Japan by focusing on such 
wartime markers.  These places it said, clearly showed that the Battle of Okinawa was simply a “bid to buy 
time （jikan kasegi） to build up defenses for the mainland and to protect the kokutai （emperor system）.”74） 
Finally, the report noted that although the weakness of the surrounding rock foundation and the issues of 
multiple land ownership （private, prefectural, and national） presented considerable obstacles, preserving 
the tunnels and opening them to the public was not only important from the standpoint of historical 
education, but was also physically possible.
　But Ōta’s administration ended in 1998 before the tunnel-preservation plan was carried out.  His 
successor, the conservative, Liberal Democratic Party （LDP）-backed Inamine Keiichi, abandoned the 
critical view of the Battle of Okinawa and Okinawa-Japan relations adopted by Okinawan progressives in 
favor of a pro-Japanese nationalist position.  His historical views became clear, for instance, during a 
debate over the proposed exhibit of the newly revamped Peace Memorial Museum scheduled to open in 
2000.  At this time, it was revealed that Inamine had ordered changes to the exhibit including changing the 
term gyakusatsu （massacre） to gisei （sacrifice） and the term suteishi sakusen （referring to the sacrifice of 
Okinawa to save the mainland） to jikyūsen （war of attrition）.75）  Then, in 2009, during another conservative 
administration led by Governor Nakaima Hirokazu, chief of the prefectural Environmental and Community 
Affairs Department （ECAD）, Chinen Kenji, citing the high cost of the project and safety concerns, 
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announced to the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly that the prefectural government had abandoned plans to 
preserve the 32nd Army tunnels or to open them to the public.76）  Later that year, Chinen explained that the 
prefecture would instead erect an historical marker near the site.77） 
　In 2011, ECAD head Shimoji Hiroshi, appointed a special committee led by University of the Ryukyu’s 
professor, Ikeda Yoshifumi, to draft plans for the proposed historical marker.  However, when the final 
version of the marker was released in 2012, Ikeda and other committee members were shocked to see that 
Shimoji’s office, with the approval of Governor Nakaima, had altered its contents consulting with them 
about the changes.  Namely, Shimoji erased passages that explained about the presence of comfort women 
in the tunnels, and about the nearby murder of Okinawan civilians as “spies” by the Japanese Army.  As 
originally conceived, the two passages in question read:
Along with Commander Ushijima Mitsuru and Chief of Staff Chō Isamu, there were around 1000 
officers and men, Okinawan military personnel and mobilized students, and women attached to the 
military including comfort women who were residing in the tunnels.78） 
Some residents around the tunnel headquarters were 
accused by the Japanese military of being ‘spies’ and were 
massacred for this.79） 
However, Shimoji and his office erased the term “comfort 
women” from the first sentence and removed the second sentence 
entirely.80）  Moreover, when the marker was eventually erected in 
March 2012, Ikeda and other committee members were shocked 
to see that there was no mention of Okinawa being a suteishi for 
the mainland in the accompanying English translation.
　When questioned about the changes in the prefectural 
assembly, Shimoji explained that he viewed the purpose of the 
marker to explain the role that the 32nd Army tunnels had played 
in the destruction of Ryukyuan cultural heritage like Shuri 
Castle, and that he wasn’t interested in “explaining the meaning 
of every single aspect of the Battle of Okinawa.”81）  In other 
words, the Nakaima administration saw wartime heritage for its 
capacity to explain the loss of Ryukyuan cultural heritage rather 
than having intrinsic value itself.  Moreover, Shimoji justified 
his actions by saying:
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The Prefecture decided to delete some sections since we could not conclusively prove their veracity. 
Especially in regard to the sections on the presence of comfort women in the tunnels, there are some 
testimonies which confirm this and others that deny it.  Therefore, since there are conflicting 
testimonies, we could not sufficiently determine the facts of the matter and, thus, we could not include 
this history on the maker.82） 
　Vigorous debate ensued in the prefectural assembly, with progressive and left parties opposing them as 
censorship of history.  Kayō Shūgi of the Japanese Communist Party （JCP）, for instance, said that there 
was no problem with original plan to preserve the tunnels, and she chastised the Nakaima administration 
for abandoning it: “as Mayor, you have the responsibility to ensure that war sites are used in a way that 
conveys the historical truth of the Battle of Okinawa and ensure that such a tragedy never occur again.  ［...］ 
To revise the historical marker in such a way as this is completely outrageous.”83）  Later, JCP member 
Nishime Sumie said: “the issue of the massacre of Okinawan civilians by the Japanese army and their use 
of comfort women is established historical fact.  The one-sided actions of the Governor to erase this history 
from the historical marker is a serious breach of Okinawans’ trust.”84）  Similarly, Tokashiki Kiyoko of the 
Japan Socialist Party （JSP） compared the Nakaima administration’s actions to earlier attempts by GOJ to 
erase Battle of Okinawa from school history textbooks and said: “even though this is a cruel history that we 
may want to avert our eyes from, we must convey the historical facts.”85）  However, Nakaima personally 
defended changes to the marker and refused allowing further modifications.86） 
　At the time of the historical-marker controversy, prominent Okinawan writer Medoruma Shun wrote that 
the current historical revisionism should be viewed against the background of the GOJ attempts to increase 
the presence of the Japanese Self Defense Forces on the island, and to strengthen the US-Japan military 
alliance.  Inconvenient historical truths from the Battle of Okinawa like the massacre of Okinawan civilians 
by the Japanese Army and the comfort women, however, “work at cross purposes” to this aim, he said, 
because they demonstrate that “the army doesn’t protect civilians.”87）  It was for this reason, Medoruma 
explained, that the national and prefectural government were seeking to “erase negative attitudes toward 
the Japanese Army among Okinawans.”88）  Moreover, he was critical of the current relationship between 
cultural and wartime heritage at the site, writing that the government wants to “sell Shuri Castle as a main 
tourist attraction of Okinawa,” and to “recreat［e］ the splendor of the Ryukyu Kingdom” there, while at the 
same time they are neglecting the “history of the Battle of Okinawa represented by the underground 32nd 
Army Headquarter tunnels.”89）  Instead of this, Medoruma urged, the government should not just be 
contented with a simple historical marker, but should work to build an historical center there that explains 
the connections between Shuri Castle and the Battle of Okinawa.  He wrote:
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It’s important to ［...］ understand the history at the Shuri site as multilayered, and to see that, in the 
shadows of this glorious past, there is also the history of the common people who suffered after being 
forced out of the land and exploited when the castle was built, and the modern history of the castle 
including the Battle of Okinawa.90） 
　Thus, Medoruma emphasized the need to adopt a holistic view of the Shuri site that accounted for its 
multiple iterations and transformations including its history as Shuri Castle and the 32nd Army tunnels 
rather than seeing these things as isolated events.  This view is perhaps closest to the perspective that this 
paper has taken in arguing for the importance of applying biography of place approach to the Shuri site.  In 
addition, Medoruma criticized one-sided approaches that selectively drew from the site’s past to create 
desired identities in the present, and he particularly singled out narratives that beautified Shuri’s past 
connections to the Ryukyu Kingdom while simultaneously ignoring its modern history and wartime roles. 
In effect, Medoruma’s comments point to the aim of this paper, which has been to show the material effects 
of various cultures of （dis） remembrance, or, that is to say, the process of memory objects being 
remembered and forgotten in discourse.
Conclusion
This paper employed the concept of “cultures of （dis） remembrance” to explain how memory objects are 
remembered and forgotten in discourse, and it applied this concept to the case of Shuri Castle and the 32nd 
Army headquarter tunnels.  It identified three discourses in particular that had important material effects at 
the Shuri site: an assimilation discourse, a Cold War discourse, and a heritage discourse.  Moreover, each 
of these discourses were adapted to fit changing socio-historical conditions.  In this way, Shuri Castle was 
largely stripped of its connotations as a symbol of Ryukyuan independence and was sublimated into the 
framework of the Japanese nation-state in the prewar.  In addition to facilitating the militarization of 
Okinawa and making imperial subjects of its people, the nationalist-assimilationist discourse of the prewar 
also had material effects including the neglect of Shuri Castle and the construction of patriotic centers of 
national education like the Okinawa Normal School nearby.  During the Battle of Okinawa, this conflicted 
with another discourse promoted by the Americans that saw Japanese militarism as a consequence of 
Japan’s inability to overcome feudalism and fully “modernize” （i.e. Modernization Theory）.  This resulted 
in the subsequent denigration of Shuri’s role as the former seat of feudal authority, and the castle itself was 
replaced with a memorial to U.S.-led modernity and liberal-democracy, the University of the Ryukyus, 
during the U.S. occupation of Okinawa.  American planners envisioned the university as a key part of its 
strategy to win the hearts and minds of men in the Cold War （i.e. Cold War discourse）.
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　Yet following their damaging defeat in the Vietnam War, the U.S. abandoned this aspect of the 
propaganda war against China and the Soviet Union, and they allowed Okinawa to revert to mainland 
Japan in return for the right to retain semi-permanent military bases there.  This context paved the way not 
only for the nationalization of Okinawan education （the University of the Ryukyus became a national 
Japanese university in 1972）, but also for the nationalization of Okinawan cultural heritage.  Shuri was 
once again transformed as the UofR prepared to move off the site, while the GOJ nationalized Ryukyuan 
cultural heritage under the rubric of Cultural Properties （bunkazai） and placed the reconstruction of Shuri 
Castle at the center of Okinawa’s newly-constructed post-reversion identity.  But this heritage discourse 
became involved in confliction visions for Okinawa’s identity and history vis-à-vis the mainland.  Namely, 
the continued subordinate position of Okinawa in the framework of the Japanese nation-state led to a 
critical assessment of Okinawa-Japan relations and, moreover, memories and wartime heritage from the 
Battle of Okinawa were placed at the center of this critique.  In this context, the GOJ and LDP-backed 
Okinawan politicians took a pro-Japanese nationalist position toward history that emphasized Ryukyuan 
cultural heritage like Shuri Castle.  This painted not only a bright picture of the past, but also strengthened 
the foundations of the Japanese nation-state and “Japanese” culture by giving it an added element of 
diversity.  At the same time, progressive Okinawans stressed wartime heritage like the 32nd Army 
headquarter tunnels to demonstrate the negative effects of militarism, both past and present.
　In conclusion, each of the discourses examined here left material footprints and changed the 
geographical landscape of the Shuri site.  Moreover, the tangible remains engendered by past and present 
discourses have shaped the way the site is interpreted and its contemporary identity.  Up to this point, such 
markers have been selectively utilized resulting in some being emphasized at the expense of others.  The 
final example of the historical marker and the artificial dichotomy that was posited by various sides 
between “cultural” and “wartime” heritage exemplifies this.  It also illustrates one of the key mechanisms of 
what this paper has termed cultures of （dis） remembrance.  However, the paper additionally suggested that 
this dilemma can be overcome via a biography of place approach which views the history of objects not in 
isolation, but rather as intertwined in each other’s histories through their shared connection of place.
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ジャスティン・アウケマ
〈要旨〉
本論文では、沖縄戦（1945年 4 月─ 6月）における代表的な戦争遺跡である32軍司令部壕の歴
史について分析する。その中で、32軍司令部壕及びそれにまつわる歴史と記憶が現在までの連続
的・累積的な言説の結果によって形成されてきたということを主張し、その過程を「（非）記憶
する文化」と呼ぶことにしている。本論文は32軍司令部壕の運命に特に大きな影響を与えた三つ
の言説を指摘する。一つ目は、沖縄を日本帝国に統合するため、沖縄と日本の関係者が両地域の
歴史的・文化的な類似点を論じた1945年以前の「同化言説」である。これによって、首里城は独
立国家であった琉球王国の権力の府という立場から、日本の愛国教育を普及させるための拠点に
変身させられた他、1945年の沖縄戦において同地での32軍司令部豪の建設を主導する拠点とも
なった。二つ目は、「冷戦言説」である。この言説では、米国占領軍は自ら目指していた戦後沖
縄イメージ（すなわちアメリカ流自由民主主義の見本及び冷戦を遂行するための拠点）を構築す
るため、琉球伝統文化、及び日本の軍国主義に関する記憶や痕跡を変容させようとした。この文
脈において、廃墟となった首里城を琉球大学として再構築し、32軍司令部壕は忘却の彼方へと沈
んでいった。しかし米軍の厳格な支配により、多くの沖縄市民は沖縄の日本本土への返還を訴え
るようになった。そのため、32軍司令部壕のような戦争遺産は沖縄と日本が「祖国」のために成
し得た共同的な犠牲についての国家主義的な語りを推進するために利用された。そして、沖縄の
1972年の返還後は、沖縄の遺産について二つの異なる見解が現れた。まず、沖縄の進歩派にとっ
て32軍司令部壕は日本の中での沖縄の下位的地位を表す象徴であり、また戦争における沖縄その
ものの物質的破壊を招いた原因でもあった。一方、ある保守系政治家は、日本国家概念を固定し
た沖縄文化遺産についてのイメージを助長させるために、地下壕にまつわる記憶を抹消しようと
してきた。
キーワード： 戦争遺跡、第32軍司令部壕、首里城、言説、（非）記憶する文化、同化、冷戦、国
営化、遺産、アイデンティティー
（非）記憶する文化：首里城における戦争記憶

